

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

RICHARD R. BOWEN,)	
)	
Appellant,)	Case No. 07R-694
)	
v.)	DECISION AND ORDER
)	REVERSING THE DECISION OF
DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF)	THE DOUGLAS COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,)	EQUALIZATION
)	
Appellee.)	

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Richard R. Bowen ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Commission's Hearing Room on the sixth floor of the Nebraska State Office Building in the City of Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on February 4, 2009, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued November 25, 2008. Commissioners Wickersham and Hotz were present. Commissioner Wickersham was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Warnes was excused from participation by the presiding hearing officer. A panel of three commissioners was created pursuant to 442 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 4, §011 (10/07). Commissioner Salmon was absent. The appeal was heard by a quorum of a panel of the Commission.

Richard R. Bowen was present at the hearing. No one appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayer.

Thomas S. Barrett, a Deputy County Attorney for Douglas County, Nebraska, was present as legal counsel for the Douglas County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits, and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

I. ISSUES

The Taxpayer has asserted that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007, is less than actual value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The actual value of the subject property on January 1, 2007.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") is described in the table below.
3. Actual value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2007, ("the assessment date") by the Douglas County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely

protest, and actual value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

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Description: Lot 35 Block 0, Rockbrook Place, Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska.

	Assessor Notice Value	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Land	\$15,800.00	\$15,000.00	\$15,800.00
Improvement	\$133,700.00	\$105,000.00	\$133,700.00
Total	\$149,500.00	\$120,000.00	\$149,500.00

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
5. The County Board was served with a Notice in Lieu of Summons and duly answered that Notice.
6. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on November 25, 2008, set a hearing of the appeal for February 4, 2009, at 1:00 p.m. CST.
7. An Affidavit of Service which appears in the records of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
8. Actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2007 is:

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Land value \$ 15,800.00

Improvement value \$122,188.00

Total value \$137,988.00.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(7) (Supp. 2007).
2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2003).
4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.”
Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al., 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 (2002).
5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2003).

6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
7. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
8. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
9. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
10. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Cum. Supp. 2006).
11. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
12. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).

13. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).
14. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).
15. "An owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its value." *U. S. Ecology v. Boyd County Bd. Of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 16, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1999).
16. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
17. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by the county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).
18. A Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf. *Josten-Wilbert Vault Co. v. Board of Equalization for Buffalo County*, 179 Neb. 415, 138 N.W.2d 641 (1965).

IV. ANALYSIS

The subject property is an improved residential parcel. The 1,250 square foot ranch style residence with a 1,250 square foot basement with 500 square feet of finish and double car basement garage was built in 1965.

The Taxpayer asserts that actual value of the subject property as determined by the County Board is too high because it represents a large increase over the prior year assessment and because various defects listed in Exhibit 2 at page 1 reduce its actual value. The Taxpayer testified that in his opinion actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007 was \$122,800. The basis for that opinion was based on actual value as determined by the County Board of Equalization for the tax year 2008.

The prior year's assessment is not relevant to the subsequent year's valuation. *DeVore v. Bd. Of Equal.*, 144 Neb. 351, 13 N.W.2d 451 (1944). *Affiliated Foods Coop v. Madison Co. Bd. Of Equal.*, 229 Neb. 605, 428 N.W.2d 201 (1988). If a prior year's valuation is not relevant then a subsequent year's valuation cannot be relevant.

The Taxpayer asserted that various factors affected actual value of the subject property. After inspection the County Board agreed and submitted evidence showing that actual value of the subject property as of January 1, 2007 was \$137,988.

An appraiser employed by the County Assessor ("Appraiser") testified that actual value of the subject property both as determined by the County Board and as recommended at the hearing on the merits was derived from application of a computer program. The program can be referred to generically as a computer assisted mass appraisal (CAMA) program. The Appraiser testified

that development of the database on which the program relies is a multi-step process. The first step is to inventory the physical characteristics and valuation factors of each parcel for which value is to be determined. Page 1 of Exhibit 5 is an example of an inventory. Page 4 of Exhibit 5 shows FIRE__MASONRY, GARAGE ATTACHED, CENTRAL H & A, BATHS, SF, and BASE 8'BLK UNFIN as physical characteristics and Market Age, Constant, and NBHD as valuation factors, as items which affect value as determined in the model. The next step is to identify sold parcels and place the information concerning the sales in a database with the inventory information. The data for sold parcels is then analyzed to determine how selected physical characteristics or valuation factors found in the inventory affected sales prices. The analytical technique used is known as multiple regression analysis. See, *The Appraisal of Real Estate*, 12th Edition, Appraisal Institute (2001) pp. 684-685. After the database is analyzed and valuation factors are assigned to physical characteristics and valuation factors, the derived values are applied to the physical characteristics and valuation factors found in the inventory of a sold parcel. An example of the resulting calculation is shown in Exhibit 5 at page 4. The value indicated by the model is then compared to the sale price of each sold parcel. The resulting ratio is a sales assessment ratio. If the model indicates a value of \$80,000 and the parcel sold for \$100,000 the sales assessment ratio is .80 ($\$80,000 \div \$100,000 = .80$). A ratio of .80 indicates that the model under-assesses parcels. If the model indicates a value of \$120,000 and the parcel sold for \$100,000 the sales assessment ratio is 1.20 ($\$120,000 \div \$100,000 = 1.20$). A ratio of 1.2 indicates that the model over-assesses parcels. The sales assessment ratios for a neighborhood are evaluated to determine if, on a statistical basis, values indicated by the model meet standards for valuation. If adjustments to the values indicated by the model must be made

to meet valuation standards, they are made by the addition of a constant amount or multiplication of the indicated contribution to value by a neighborhood factor or both. After adjustments to the model have been made, the values established by the model are applied to unsold parcels to estimate their actual value. See, *Mass Appraisal of Real Property*, International Association of Assessing Officers, ch 4, (1999).

After an indication of value is developed using the model, that value is evaluated against the sales prices of similar parcels as found in the County Assessor's database. An example of the information used in that evaluation is shown in Exhibit 4 at page 5. The Residential Sales Comparables Inventory and Account Value Summary as shown in Exhibit 4 at page 5 does not demonstrate use of the sales comparison approach, it merely shows sales of similar parcels and allows the user to determine whether actual value as determined by the model is acceptable with those sales as references.

The model is obviously dependent on an accurate inventory of physical characteristics and valuation factors for sold and unsold parcels.

In this appeal, an inspection of the subject property by an appraiser employed by the County Assessor indicated that the inventory of physical characteristics and valuation factors for the subject property did not properly describe the size of the unfinished basement or the condition of the improvement. The appraiser reran the computer model. The resulting indication of value was \$137,413 as shown in Exhibit 5 at page 5. The appraiser also testified that the deduction for market age shown in Exhibit 8 was overstated by \$500 because that deduction increases at a rate of \$250 per year and when it was run it calculated that deduction for the year

2009 rather than 2007. The correct calculation results in an indication of value at \$137,988 as follows:

Physical Characteristic or Valuation Factor	Affect on Value
Market Age	-10,500
GARAGE BASE 2	+8,000
CENTRAL H & A	+6,250
BATHS	+10,000
SF	+50,000
BASE 8'BLK UNFIN	+15,000
BASE FIN	+10,000
MULTI LEVEL	-7,500
FIRE METAL	+5,000
Constant	<u>+20,000</u>
Unadjusted Contribution to Value	<u>106,250</u>

The Unadjusted Contribution to Value is then multiplied by the NBHD factor of 1.15 for a resulting contribution to value by the improvements of \$106,250 ($\$106,250 \times 1.15 = \$122,188$).

The contribution to value made by the improvements is added to the value of the land for a total of \$137,988 ($\$122,188 + \$15,800 = \$137,988$).

The County Board's decision was arbitrary or unreasonable because it was not based on accurate information about the subject property. The actual value as indicated by the model after

correct information concerning the subject property is utilized is the most reasonable evidence of actual value before the Commission.

**V.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be vacated and reversed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining actual value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2007, is vacated and reversed.
2. Actual value, for the tax year 2007, of the subject property is:

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Land value \$ 15,800.00

Improvement value \$122,188.00

Total value \$137,988.00.

3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Douglas County Treasurer, and the Douglas County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
 4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
 5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
 6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2007.
 7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on February 19, 2009.
- Signed and Sealed. February 19, 2009.

Robert W. Hotz, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (CUM. SUPP. 2006), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.

I concur in the result.

The Commission has considered two standards of review for its review of the County Board's decision. of review one stated as a presumption the other stated in statute. I do not believe consideration of two standards of review is required by statute or case law.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. See, *Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. Id. The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax

Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007).

In general the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Cum. Supp. 2008).

The Commission is authorized to review decision of a County Board of Equalization determining taxable values. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). Review of County Board of Equalization decisions is not new in Nebraska law. As early as 1903 Nebraska Statutes provided for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.* A standard of review stated as a presumption was adopted by Nebraska's Supreme Court. See, *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887). The presumption was that the County Board had faithfully performed its official duties and had acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. See, *Id.* In 1959 the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the District Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). After adoption of the statutory standard of review Nebraska Courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5011 of the Nebraska Statutes created a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties and has acted upon sufficient

competent evidence to justify its actions. See, e.g. *Ideal Basic Indus. V. Nucholls Cty. Bd. Of Equal.*, 231 Neb. 297, 437 N.W.2d 501 (1989). The presumption stated by the Court was the presumption that had been found before the statute was enacted.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts review of a county board of equalization's decision. See, e.g. *Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County of Lancaster*, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). In *Hastings Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for reviews by the district court; one statutory requiring a finding that the decision reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary, and another judicial requiring a finding that a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence was overcome. No attempt was made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the District Courts.

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001 section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511 the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016(8) requires a finding that the decision being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Brenner v. Banner County Board of Equalization*, 276 Neb. 275, 753 N.W.2d 802 (2008). The Supreme Court has stated that the presumption

which arose from section 77-1511 is applicable to the decisions of the Commission. *Garvey Elevators, Inc. V. Adams County Bd. of Equalization*, 261 Neb. 130, 621 N.w.2d 518 (2001).

The possible results from application of the presumption as a standard of review and the statutory standard of review are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome because the statutory standard remains. See, *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, and the statutory standard remains after the presumption has been overcome. See. *Id.* The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *Id.* Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g. *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York*, *supra*. Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may however overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully

discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event the statutory standard has been met and relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. See, G. Michael Fenner, About Presumptions in Civil Cases, 17 Creighton L. Rev. 307 (1984). In the view of that author the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. See, *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

Wm R. Wickersham, Commissioner